Congress Can Sanction Russia Without Adding to Consumers’ Costs

At a time when consumers are already navigating higher gasoline and energy prices, keeping everyday costs manageable for American families is a priority for leading retailers and should remain a priority for policymakers. As Congress works to confront Russia and those financing its war against Ukraine, lawmakers have an opportunity to pursue an important foreign policy objective while protecting consumers from unintended new costs resulting from broad new tariff authorities. 

The Senate recently passed S. 5025, the Lindsay O Graham Russia Sanctions Act with the aim to support Ukraine’s efforts against Russia. Unequivocally, retailers support strong, targeted sanctions against Russia for their aggression against Ukraine. But one provision in the Russia sanctions legislation deserves additional, critical scrutiny: a new authority to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on goods from major buyers of Russian energy. While intended as a punishment to Russia, these tariffs will very likely hurt American families and businesses. Not only do those tariffs risk raising prices across many products, but they could also negatively affect Ukraine and the allies working to counter Russia, potentially undermining the stated goals of the proposal.  

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the United States has worked with dozens of allied nations to build an unprecedented coalition. Yet under this proposal, some of those same partners could potentially face punitive tariffs, threatening the cooperation that has been essential to the effort. 

The goal behind the tariff provision is understandable. Countries that continue to provide Russia with substantial energy revenues can undermine the effectiveness of sanctions. But the mechanism Congress chooses matters. Secondary tariffs on imports from countries supporting Russia’s oil sanctions evasion conflates sanctions (a foreign policy and national security tool) with tariffs, which have historically been used to achieve trade policy objectives. This muddying of tariffs and sanctions creates implementation challenges that can ultimately undermine the effectiveness of both mechanisms through unintended consequences. For example, S. 5025, requires diplomatic engagement with the European Union and its member states, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, several of whom could be subject to proposed tariffs, either for importing Russian oil and energy products including gas, or for facilitating sanctions evasion. 

Tariffs imposed on goods entering the United States are ultimately costs borne here at home. A tariff intended to pressure a foreign government can also increase costs for American importers, disrupt established supply chains and create additional price pressures for consumers. 

That is particularly important when considering some of the trading partners that could be affected. 

Reworking supply chains can take years, forcing retailers to grapple with higher costs in the interim and injecting additional instability into the market. 

And these new tariffs would not necessarily replace duties already in place. They stack on top of existing tariffs. The result could be extremely high cumulative tariff rates on some products. 

For retailers, predictability in trade policy matters. Companies make sourcing, inventory and investment decisions months—and often years—in advance. Dramatic changes in tariff rates can force businesses to reevaluate suppliers, transportation networks and purchasing decisions with very little notice. 

That kind of volatility carries costs of its own. Businesses do everything they can to absorb higher expenses and remain competitive, but government-imposed costs cannot always be shielded from consumers. 

Congress should also consider the longer-term implications of creating such a significant new tariff authority. The legislation would not apply only to decisions made today. It would give any future administration substantial discretion to impose tariffs as high as 100 percent on major U.S. trading partners, with relatively few limits or checks on how that authority is exercised. 

Congress should be cautious about establishing a tool that could eventually be used more broadly than lawmakers intend today. For this reason, we urge the House to strengthen S. 5025 by removing the broad tariff authority or, at a minimum, narrowing it substantially. If Congress retains a tariff mechanism, it should be limited to clearly defined circumstances, calibrated to achieve measurable reductions in Russian energy purchases, subject to regular congressional review and paired with a workable off-ramp such as a clear sunset. Congress should also require effective oversight to ensure tariff-based secondary sanctions are used only for the Russia-related purposes Congress intends and not as open-ended trade authority unrelated to the national security objective. 

None of this diminishes the importance of sanctions against Russia. Nor does it mean countries or companies helping Russia evade sanctions should escape consequences. The question for lawmakers is how to make those tools as effective and targeted as possible without unnecessarily increasing costs for American families. 

The House now has an opportunity to take a closer look at the tariff section and improve it. 

House lawmakers should work with businesses and other stakeholders to rewrite those provisions, so they more precisely target the conduct Congress is trying to deter, establish appropriate safeguards and reduce the risk of sweeping tariffs on consumer goods. 

That would strengthen, not weaken, the overall effort.